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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1693 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ADAM J. WINDON, 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-11-cr-00070-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 8, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 17, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Adam Windon appeals the District Court’s judgment that he serve his federal 
sentence consecutively to his state sentence.  He also appeals the conditions of his 
supervised release.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
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 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis.   
On September 26, 2008, Windon was arrested and charged with aggravated 
indecent assault, corruption of minors, and unlawful conduct with minors.  On May 6, 
2010, a state court judge sentenced Windon to a term of five to fifteen years’ 
imprisonment. 
 Jennifer Sager, Windon’s wife, later contacted police in order to turn over some of 
Windon’s electronic equipment.  Police obtained search warrants for the equipment and 
eventually discovered 1,134 images and 165 movies that met the federal standards for 
child pornography.  None of the children shown in the images or movies were among the 
children whom Windon abused in committing the state offenses.  On September 1, 2011, 
Windon pled guilty to possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). 
 The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) indicated that Windon’s base 
offense level was governed by U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(1).  The PSR included a five point 
enhancement for a pattern of sexual abuse.  The PSR also noted that under U.S.S.G. 
§ 5G1.3(c), the District Court had discretion to run Windon’s federal sentence 
concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to his state prison sentence.  
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Windon objected to this determination in the PSR and argued that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), 
which provides for a concurrent sentence, should be applied.   
The District Court disagreed and imposed a 120-month sentence to be served 
consecutively to the five-to-fifteen-year state sentence that Windon was already serving.  
The District Court also referenced the nature of Windon’s criminal history and imposed a 
twelve-year term of supervised release, which requires Windon to submit himself to be 
searched at any time by any law enforcement officer who has reasonable suspicion that 
Windon is violating a condition of his supervised release or engaging in unlawful 
conduct. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s interpretation of 
the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary.  United States v. Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 
2010).  We review the District Court’s factual findings as to whether the offenses were 
part of a continuing course of conduct for clear error.  Id.  We review the District Court’s 
decision to impose a special condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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III. 
A. 
 In a sentencing situation such as this one where a previous offense forms the basis 
for an increase in the offense level for the instant offense, a sentence shall be imposed to 
run concurrently if the previous offense involved “relevant conduct to the instant 
offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).  “In any other case involving an undischarged term of 
imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently, 
partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment.”  
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). 
With respect to offenses, such as Windon’s, for which U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) 
requires grouping of multiple counts, “relevant conduct” includes “all acts or omissions 
. . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the 
offense of conviction.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2); Jansen v. United States, 369 F.3d 237, 
248 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) standard “when the offense of 
conviction is a groupable offense, regardless of the nature of the alleged relevant 
conduct.”). 
We consider three factors in determining whether offenses are part of the same 
course of conduct:  “(1) the temporal proximity between the two offenses; (2) the 
similarity of the offenses; and (3) the regularity of the offenses.”  Kulick, 629 F.3d at 171 
(citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n. 9(B)).  Although there is no bright-line rule defining 
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what constitutes the same course of conduct, the relative strengths of the three factors 
must be individually assessed.  Id. 
Although Windon possessed child pornography during the time period in which he 
was found to have sexually assaulted children, the two offenses are not sufficiently 
similar to be part of the same course of conduct.  Windon argues that both offenses 
involve vulnerable children and offenders who operate “in the darkest corners of 
society’s secretive and salacious underbelly.”  Appellant’s Br. at 24.  Possession of child 
pornography, however, involves separate and distinct conduct from sexual assault of 
children who are not associated with the child pornography.  Furthermore, given the 
separate and distinct conduct of these two offenses, we cannot conclude that the offenses 
occurred with the same regularity. 
Because the two offenses were not part of the same course of conduct, Windon’s 
conviction for aggravated assault is not relevant conduct to his conviction for possession 
of child pornography, and thus, under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), it was within the District 
Court’s discretion to impose Windon’s federal sentence to be served consecutively to his 
state sentence. 
B. 
Windon also challenges as overbroad the District Court’s supervised release 
condition requiring him to submit to be searched at any time by any law enforcement 
officer who has reasonable suspicion that Windon is violating a condition of his release 
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or engaging in unlawful conduct.  Sentencing courts have broad discretion to impose 
special conditions of supervised release if such conditions are “reasonably related” to the 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Maurer, 639 F.3d at 82.  Moreover, conditions 
of supervised release may impose “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 
necessary to deter criminal conduct, protect the public, and rehabilitate the defendant.”  
Id. at 83 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
Here, after finding that Windon presented a danger to the public, the District Court 
stated that the condition of supervised release was based on the nature of Windon’s 
criminal history.  The District Court also limited searches to situations in which officers 
have reasonable suspicion to believe Windon is violating a condition of his release or 
engaging in criminal activity, and thus, the District Court ensured that the deprivation of 
liberty was not greater than necessary.  Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing the condition of supervised release. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment that 
Windon serve his federal sentence consecutively to his state sentence.  We will also 
affirm the District Court’s condition of supervised release. 
